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Abstract 
The relationship between Human Resource Management (HRM) and firm performance has 
been a hotly debated topic over the last decade, especially in the United States (e.g. Osterman, 
1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). The question arises whether the domination of USA 
oriented models, however appropriate they might be for, say, the USA, hold in other for 
example more institutionalised contexts. Now we have the opportunity to study recent 
empirical data on the effectiveness of human resource management in the Netherlands, using 
Control versus Commitment HR Theory (Walton, 1985; Arthur, 1994) in combination with 
New Institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). We were able to include three different 
Dutch sectors/branches of industry i.e. Health care, Local Government and Tourism. 
Empirical results suggest that the effect of HRM is lower in highly institutionalised sectors 
(hospitals and local governments) than in a less institutionalised sector like hotels.
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Introduction 
The majority of empirical scientific research in  the area of HRM and performance stems 
from the USA1 and, to a lesser extent, from the UK2. Empirical results on HRM and 
performance are presented in special issues of international journals like The Academy of 
Management Journal (4:39, 1996), Industrial Relations (1996), The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management (3:8, 1997; and 7:12, 2001), Human Resource Management 
(Fall, 1997), and The Human Resource Management Journal (Fall, 1999). Global seminars 
and conferences3 all demonstrate lasting attention for the topic. The outcomes of worldwide 
research suggest significant impact of HRM on the competitive advantage of organisations. 
Prior empirical research, summarised and classified in the work of Delery and Doty (1996), 
Guest (1997) and Boselie et al. (2001), suggests significant impact of HRM on the 
competitive advantage of organisations. The question arises whether the USA oriented 
models, however appropriate they might be for, say, the USA, hold in other contexts (see 
debate in special issue of The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 7:12, 
2001). The mainstream 'best practices approaches', also labelled universalistic mode (Delery 
and Doty, 1996) and 'high performance' work practices (Guest, 1997), do not seriously take 
into account differences in culture and institutional settings (Paauwe, 1998).  
 
Research findings from European countries like Germany (e.g. Backes-Gellner, Frick and 
Sadowski, 1997), France (e.g. d'Arcimoles, 1997), and the Netherlands (e.g. Leijten, 1992; 
Schilstra, 1998) are interesting because they reflect the so-called Rhineland model of 
industrial relations, in which legislation, institutions and stakeholders, like trade unions and 
works councils all play an important role in shaping HRM policies and practices. This study 
will be built on the theoretical assumptions of Delery and Doty's (1996) configurational 
mode, represented in the work of Walton (1985) and Arthur (1994). The configurational mode 
(e.g. Arthur, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995) is rather more complex than the universalistic mode or 
'best practices' approach (e.g. Pfeffer, 1994) and the contingency mode (e.g. Schuler and 
Jackson, 1987). The configurational mode assumes that the optimal organisational design, 
including human resource management, depends on external (e.g. branch of industry, 
technology level and market situation) and internal factors (e.g. cultural heritage, structure of 
ownership and path dependency). Wood (1999) makes a distinction between two fundamental 
approaches in the HRM and performance debate: (a) the best-practices stream and (b) the 
best-fit stream. The universalistic mode corresponds with Wood's (1999) best-practice stream, 
while the contingency and configurational mode match with the best-fit stream. In the 
contingency mode 'best-fit' is mainly focused on external fit: fit between organisational design 
(e.g. HRM) and external contingencies like the market situation. The outside-in approach in 
strategic management was quite popular in the eighties under the direction of the work of 
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amongst others Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow (1984), but appears to be overruled by the 
introduction of the resource based view (e.g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Wright et al., 
1994; Barney and Wright, 1998), that led to a shift in strategic management thinking from 
'traditional' outside-in to 'emerging' inside-out thinking. The configurational mode unites 
'traditional' strategic management theory, in terms of taking into account external factors that 
affect the organisational design (e.g. characteristics of the branch of industry), and resource 
based elements, in terms of internal factors like the uniqueness of the organisational 
configuration (in terms of for example organisational structure, culture and systems), and is 
therefore preferable in our opinion (see for example the human resource based theory of 
Paauwe, 1994). To do justice to the Dutch Rhineland context it is necessary to add an 
alternative approach to the configurational mode: new institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983). Thus, we set out to partly replicate the US research of Arthur (1994) and partly to 
modify the model to continental standards with respect to the industrial relations model with 
the help of new institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
Theorising: Control and Commitment HR Systems  
The operationalisation of commitment oriented systems in our study is based on the work of 
Walton (1985) and Arthur (1994). Together with the work of Huselid (1995) and MacDuffie 
(1995), Arthur's (1994) study is one of the most quoted articles on the added value of HRM in 
the nineties. Arthur's (1994) approach is theoretically rooted in the classical work of 
McGregor (1960) on theory X and theory Y, and the Harvard Business Review article of 
Walton (1985) on control versus commitment strategies of organisations. Walton's (1985) 
conceptual model hypothesises that commitment work systems outperform traditional work 
systems in organisations. Traditional (control) work systems are characterised by narrowly 
defined jobs, specialisation of employees, close supervision and monitoring of employees by 
management, hierarchical structure, centralisation of power and a focus on cost reduction 
strategies. In contrast, the commitment work systems encompass broadly defined jobs, job 
rotation, evaluation by peers, non-hierarchical structure, decentralisation of power and a focus 
on differentiation strategies (see table 1).   
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Table 1 Traditional- versus High-Commitment Work Systems 
 
‘Traditional Work System’   ‘High-Commitment Work System’ 
narrowly defined jobs    broadly defined jobs 
specialization of employees    rotation of employees through jobs 
pay by specific job content   pay by skills mastered 
evaluation by direct supervision   evaluation by peers 
work is under close supervision   evaluation by peers 
assignment of overtime or transfer    team assigns members to cover 
by rule book     vacancies in  
flexible fashion 
no career development    concern for learning and growth 
employee as individuals    employee in a team 
employee is ignorant about business  teams runs a business; business data  
shared widely 
status symbols used to reinforce hierarchy  status differences minimized 
employees have input on few matters  broad employee participation 
 
Source: Walton in Beer et al. (1984) 
 
Arthur's (1994) control- and commitment HR systems are based on the idea that "the closer an 
organisation's HR practices resemble the correct prototypical system (for its business 
strategy), the greater the performance gains (Delery and Doty, 1996)".  The two systems in 
Arthur’s (1994) approach are labelled commitment- and control human resource systems. The 
correct HR system or bundle from a 'best practice approach' (e.g. Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 
1994) is presumed to be the commitment variant. Low scores on direct supervision, individual 
bonus or incentive payments in combination with high scores on decentralisation, employee 
participation, general training, skill development, social activities, due processes, high wages 
and employee benefits represent commitment HR systems in this approach. The opposite 
applies for control HR systems (see table 2).  
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Table 2 Control- versus Commitment HR Systems  
 
‘Control HR Systems’    ‘Commitment HR Systems’ 
centralisation     decentralisation 
no participation     participation 
no general training    general training 
no skills training     skills training 
no social activities    social activities 
no due process     due process 
low wages     high wages 
no employee benefits    employee benefits 
direct supervision    no direct supervision 
individual bonus or    group bonus or incentive 
incentive payments    payments 
 
Source: Arthur (1994) 
 
Arthur's (1994) empirical results on the effectiveness of HR control- versus HR commitment 
systems suggest that commitment systems outperform control systems in USA steel mills. 
Organisations with a commitment oriented HR system have significant higher scores on 
productivity and lower scores on employee turnover than the control oriented steel mills. 
Arthur's (1994) analysis however is on organisational level. The study was based on data of 
30 USA steels mills and the data stem from HR managers. The work of Wallace (1995) 
covers corporatist control and organisational commitment among lawyers working in law 
firms, with the analysis on employee level. Activities in Wallace's research, that fit the 
commitment HR system of Arthur (1994) like co-worker support, promotional opportunities 
and employee autonomy, have a positive effect on employee satisfaction. The basic 
assumptions in these approaches have their roots in McGregor's (1960) theoretical distinction 
between Theory X and Theory Y. The traditional management view (Theory X) assumes that 
employees dislike work, avoid responsibility, lack ambition, and the only way to motivate 
people is the application of external control and punishment. In this view 'poor performance' 
of an organisation is presumed to be a result of the human nature of an employee. Since the 
sixties this view is overruled, at least in contemporary science, by what McGregor (1960) 
calls Theory Y. This perspective has a different starting point. Poor performance of 
employees is not the result of their human nature but an outcome of an imperfect work 
system. By nature each individual wants self-direction and self-control, seeks and accepts 
responsibility, perceives work as a source of satisfaction, and needs self-direction and self-
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control. In our opinion Theory Y incorporates a strong argument for the application of a 
commitment oriented work system.  
 
Theorising: New Institutionalism 
Of course it is possible to apply the theoretical framework of control versus commitment in a 
Western-European or Dutch setting. At the same time we need to take into account the 
differences in context from an economic and industrial relations point of view. The Rhineland 
model is a stakeholder and consultation oriented type of  industrial relations system, in which 
legislation, social partnership, CBA regulations, trade unions and works councils have a 
major say in the shaping of HR policies and practices (Paauwe, 1998; Schilstra, 1998), 
whereas the USA based system is more associated with strategic goal orientation towards 
shareholder value. For this reason we are in need of additional theorising in the area of HRM 
and performance.  The dichotomy of control versus commitment oriented HR work systems 
needs embeddedment in a theoretical framework, which will enable us to account for the 
influence of institutions etc.  Dimaggio’s and Powell’s (1983 and 1991) New Institutionalism 
might be able to offer us the indispensable elements for explaining variations in the 
relationship between HR systems and performance in a Western-European setting. Dimaggio 
and Powell (1983) state that rational actors make their organisations increasingly similar as 
they try to change them (homogenisation). The concept that best captures the process of 
homogenisation is isomorphism. Isomorphism is a constraining process which, say Dimaggio 
and Powell (1983), forces one unit in a population to resemble other units which face the 
same set of environmental conditions. There are two types of isomorphism: competitive and 
institutional. Competitive isomorphism assumes a system of rationality which emphasises 
market competition, niche change, and fitness measures, and is most relevant where free 
markets and open competition exists. "It explains parts of the process of bureaucratisation that 
Weber observed, and may apply to early adoption of innovation, but it does not present a fully 
adequate picture of the modern world of organisations." (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). For a 
full understanding of organisational change the authors focus on an alternative perspective: 
institutional isomorphism. Three institutional mechanisms are said to influence decision-
making in organisations: 
 
- coercive mechanisms, which stem from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, 
- mimetic mechanisms, which result from standard responses to uncertainty, and 
- normative mechanisms, which are associated with professionalisation. 
 
In the Dutch context, coercive mechanisms include the influence of social partners 
(employers’ organisations,  trade unions and works councils), labour legislation, and 
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government; examples are the Law on Works councils (WOR), Law on CBA and the Law on 
Contingent labour and Security (Flexwet). Mimetic mechanisms refer to imitations of the 
strategies and practices of competitors as a result of uncertainty, or hypes in the field of 
management. It is difficult to determine whether the implication of a certain practice or policy 
is the result of pure blind imitation. Implementation of, for example, 360-degree feedback 
systems, the balanced scorecard, and employability or Learning Organisation principles may 
either have a strategic foundation or may simply  be a result of imitation. Normative 
mechanisms refer to the relation between management policies and the professional 
background of employees in terms of educational level, job experience and craftsmanship. 
This mechanism assumes that the degree of professionalisation of employees affects the 
nature of a management control system and its related practices. In figure 1 the three 
institutional mechanisms of Dimaggio and Powell (1983) are translated to the field of human 
resource management. We assume that the mechanisms influence HRM strategy, goals and 
policies (see figure 1).  Based on both a control  versus commitment theory and institutional 
theory we will develop our key issues and hypotheses and research design  in the following 
sections 
 
Figure 1 HRM and New Institutionalism 
HRM 
Strategy/ 
Policy/ 
Goals 
Mimetic: 
Imitation as a 
result of 
uncertainty 
 
Imitation as a 
result of 
trends/hypes 
Coercive: 
Implementation 
as a result of 
institutional 
forces 
Normative: 
Management 
control system 
depending on 
the professio-
nalization of an 
employee 
category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Dimaggio and Powell (1983) and Boselie et al. (2001) 
 
Key issues and Hypotheses 
Referring to USA and UK based research in the area of HRM and performance we first of all 
would like to find out whether replicating empirical research with  respect to control versus 
commitment oriented HR systems in a Dutch setting will generate the same kind of results as 
for example the research done by Arthur (1994). Arthur's (1994) results reveal positive 
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impact of commitment (versus control) oriented HR systems on organisational performance in 
USA steel mills. Hypothesis 1 is based on Arthur's assumptions and research findings. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Organisations with commitment human resource systems will have better 
organisational performance than organisations with control human resource systems.  
 
Since we only have one steel mill in the Netherlands we can replicate the study,  but we will 
have to include another type of organisations in other branches of industry (see section on 
Methods). Our second and related key issue involves the role of the institutional context. 
Does the context interfere with the relationship between HRM and Performance and what 
possible effects might the institutional context have on the two different HR systems of control 
versus commitment. The institutional context  (for example legislation, CBA regulations, 
works councils with their legal prerogatives, rate of unionisation) might limit the available 
alternatives for designing and implementing HR policies and practices and will in this way 
limit the opportunities for differentiation between companies in order to achieve a 
competitive advantage from a HRM point of view. In this respect it is interesting to note that 
Pfeffer's so-called 16 best practices, which claim to make a positive difference in an on 
average ‘hire and fire’ climate in the USA, hardly contribute to a competitive advantage in the 
Dutch setting. Due to legislation, CBA regulations and the lasting influence of works councils 
and trade unions since the seventies ten to twelve of Pfeiffer’s ‘best practices’ are quite 
common in the majority of companies in the Netherlands (Paauwe, 1998) (see table 3).  
 
 9
Table 3 Pfeffer's 'Best Practices' and Paauwe's Comments 
Best Practices (Pfeffer, 1994): HR Practices that are common in the 
Netherlands since the seventies 
(Paauwe, 1998): 
1) Employment Security Yes 
2) Selectivity in Recruiting -- 
3) High Wages Yes 
4) Incentive Pay -- 
5) Employee Ownership Yes 
6) Information Sharing Yes 
7) Participation and Empowerment Yes 
8) Self-managed Teams Yes 
9) Training and Skill Development Yes 
10) Cross-utilization and Cross-training -- 
11) Symbolic Egalitarianism -- 
12) Wage Compression Yes 
13) Promotion from within Yes 
14) Long Term Perspective Yes 
15) Monitoring of Practices -- 
16) All-embracing Philosophy -- 
Sources: Pfeffer (1994) and Paauwe (1998)  
 
This simply implies that at the level of the individual company the possibilities for achieving 
a competitive advantage by using these so-called best practices is not feasible or will only 
have a marginal effect. In this respect, however, it is important to take into account in our 
research design the differences in the degree of  institutionalisation per branch of industry. 
Some sectors in the Netherlands (e.g. metal industry, construction building, public sector, 
health care) face a larger institutional impact than other sectors like for example financial 
services, tourism and those emerging in the so-called new economy (e.g. ICT-business), who 
have a low degree of  institutionalisation. The degree of unionisation, the strength of works 
council power and the extent of the CBA coverage are possible indicators for 
institutionalisation. High degrees of unionisation, strong and proactive work councils, and 
extensive CBA's represent a high degree of institutionalisation. The opposite holds for a low 
degree of institutionalisation. We will give a more detailed description of the concept of 
institutionalisation further on in this paper. The research of Klandermans and Visser (1995) in 
the Netherlands suggests that the following factors lead to high degrees of institutionalisation: 
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1. organisational size; large organisations reveal higher scores on 'degree of unionisation' 
and 'works council installed' than small and medium-sized organisations 
2. nature of the sector; non-profit organisations are more institutionalised than profit 
organisations  
 
On the basis of the prior research on institutionalisation in the Netherlands (Klandermans and 
Visser, 1995) we formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Small organisations are less institutionalised than large organisations in the 
Netherlands. 
Hypothesis 2b: Profit organisations are less institutionalised than non-profit organisations in 
the Netherlands. 
 
When we are capable of determining which organisations are 'high institutionalised' and 
which of them are 'low institutionalised', we are able to study possible moderating effects on 
the relationship between HRM and performance. New institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983) argues that high institutionalisation affects the relationship between HRM and 
performance. In this study HRM is defined by Walton's (1985) and Arthur's (1994) concepts 
on control and commitment systems, which we will label 'work systems'. Homogeneity, the 
result of institutional mechanisms, of organisations leads to less impact of HRM, here defined 
as work systems, on the performance of the organisation (see hypothesis 3). 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of a work system (commitment  and control human resource 
systems) on organisational performance is smaller in an institutionalised context than the 
impact of a work system (commitment  and control human resource systems) on 
organisational performance in a less institutionalised context.  
 
Methods 
Apart from selecting companies and branches of industry in which we expect a variation in 
the application of control versus commitment HR systems, we also have to include variation 
in the degree of institutionalisation. As indicators we used the rate of unionisation and the 
degree of extensiveness of CBA regulations.  We were able to include three different 
sectors/branches of industry (from the Netherlands) i.e. Health care, Local Government and 
Tourism. Data have been collected by means of questionnaires (N=132). HR managers were 
asked to fill in the forms for their business unit. All data are collected in the year 2000 and 
2001. See table 4 for a more detailed description of our research approach. 
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Table 4 
 Hospitals 
 
Hotels Local Governments 
Number of 
Observations 
 
38 25 69 
Response Rate 
 
31% 19% 40% 
Focus on Employee 
Group 
 
 
nurses waiters, cleaners, 
receptionists, and 
kitchen helps 
civil servants 
Excluded Employee 
Groups 
 
 
managers/ 
supervisors, 
staff 
managers/ 
supervisors, 
staff 
managers/ 
supervisors, 
staff 
Average Size of 
Organisation in 
sample (employees) 
 
1605  
 
89  
 
238  
 
Minimum Size  291  
 
23  
 
100  
 
Maximum Size  4270  
 
275  
 
417  
 
 
Hospitals, representing the health care industry, and local governments are medium-sized to 
large, non-profit organisations in contrast to hotels, representing the tourism industry in the 
Netherlands. As a result of the relatively small size of the Netherlands and therefore limited 
number of organisations in specific branches of industry, we were not able to replicate 
Arthur's (1994) approach on Dutch steel mills, simply because there is only one steel mill in 
the Netherlands. 38 hospitals (response rate = 31%), 25 hotels (response rate = 19%), and 69 
local governments (response rate = 40%) are included in this analysis. The questions in the 
survey are aimed at specific groups of employees within the firm in order to control for large 
variances between employee groups within one organisation. The respondents were asked to 
fill in the survey list with a focus on employees on 'shopfloor level', more specifically: (a) 
nurses in hospitals; (b) waiters/cleaners/ receptionists/kitchen helps in hotels; and (c) civil 
servants in local governments. Managers and staff personnel were excluded.  
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Measures 
Human Resource Systems. The application of Arthur's (1994) model in the Netherlands 
implies some practical problems. As stated before (see table 3), a lot of USA oriented 'best 
practices' are common in the Netherlands since the seventies. Arthur's (1994) research 
concepts like (employee) participation, due processes, high wages, and employee benefits are 
institutionalised by collective bargaining agreements and other labour laws. Performance 
related pay, related to Arthur's (1994) concept of incentive payments, is not very common in 
most Dutch sectors as a result of trade union resistance. The operationalisation of the human 
resource systems in this research is therefore focused on: employee influences, general 
training, participation in seminars, skill training, social activities, job rotation, and direct 
supervision (see table 5 for detailed descriptive information on the HRM items in this 
analysis).  
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Table 5  Descriptives (N=132)  
Name 
 
Description Means Standard 
Deviation 
Infl_1 Degree to which employees monitor quality, costs, 
productivity, and execution of work  
3.06 0.70 
Infl_2 Degree to which employees determine order of tasks 
among each other  
3.10 0.79 
Infl_3 Degree to which an employee has room to invest in 
new materials and technology  
2.07 0.74 
Infl_4 Degree to which employees have influence over their 
own activities  
3.39 0.76 
Training Degree to which employees participate in general 
training programs in social skills such as a presentation 
and communication training  
2.65 0.94 
Seminar Degree to which employees participate in seminars and 
conferences every year 
2.90 0.85 
Skill Degree to which employees are offered opportunities 
for further development of specific skills  
3.58 0.71 
Social Degree to which the employer organizes social events 
for employees  
2.96 1.01 
Rotation Degree to which employees are in a job rotation 
program   
1.87 0.82 
Superv_1 Degree to which the supervisor monitors the activities 
of the employees  
3.11 0.74 
Superv_2 Degree to which the supervisor gives orders to 
employees on a daily basis  
2.93 0.88 
Superv_3 Degree to which the supervisor influences an 
employee's planning  
3.11 0.80 
Part_1 Degree to which employees are involved in decision-
making with respect to selection of new colleagues  
3.69 0.97 
Part_2 Degree to which employees are involved in policy 
making  
3.23 0.80 
Team Degree to which employee operate in autonomous 
teams  
2.26 1.09 
Reward_1 Degree to which employees can earn individual 
performance related pay  
2.25 1.07 
Reward_2 Degree to which employees are rewarded for 
participation in teams  
1.81 0.86 
Reward_3 Degree to which employees have the opportunity to 
participate in profit sharing  
1.14 0.61 
Qual_1 Degree to which employees have to deal with external 
quality control, for example ISO certificates  
2.08 1.24 
Qual_2 Degree to which employees have to deal with internal 
quality control or peer evaluation  
2.63 1.05 
Scale: 1 = very little 2 = little  3 = reasonable 4 = much 5 = very much 
 
Principal component analysis was used to determine underlying factors. The application of 
principal component analysis on the 20 HRM items leads to 6 underlying factors on the basis 
of eigenvalues > 1.000. But if we look more closely at the percentage of variance explained 
by each component (or factor) we find that component 1 explains 23% of the variance, 
component 2 explains over 17% of the variance, and the following components explain each 
less than 8% of the variance (see table 6).  
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Table 6  Principal Component Analysis on HRM items 
Component Initial 
Eigenvalues: 
Total 
Percentage of 
Variance 
Explained 
Cumulative 
Percentage of 
Variance 
Explained 
1 4.658 23.292 23.292 
2 3.481 17.407 40.699 
3 1.602 8.008 48.707 
4 1.171 5.856 54.563 
5 1.048 5.239 59.802 
6 1.034 5.169 64.971 
7 0.878 -- -- 
8 0.782 -- -- 
9 0.737 -- -- 
Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation, rotation converged in 31 iterations 
 
These findings suggest a possible 2-factor-solution. If we remove the items 'social', 'rotation' 
and 'part_1' we find strong statistical evidence for a 2-factor-solution. Factor 1 represents 
employee influence, employee training, attendance of seminars, skill development, employee 
participation, teamwork and reward systems with a Cronbach  of 0.80 (see table 7).  
 
Table 7  Rotated Component Matrix of a 2-factor-solution on HRM 
Name Component/Factor 1 
"commitment  
HR systems" 
Component/Factor 2 
"control  
HR systems" 
Infl_1 0.53 0.16 
Infl_2 0.37 0.25 
Infl_3 0.64 0.05 
Infl_4 0.55 0.00 
Training 0.58 0.11 
Seminar  0.61 -0.39 
Skill 0.54 -0.02 
Superv_1 -0.11 0.73 
Superv_2 -0.18 0.81 
Superv_3 -0.13 0.73 
Part_2  0.59 -0.31 
Team 0.60 -0.10 
Reward_1 0.60 -0.05 
Reward_2 0.77 0.16 
Reward_3 0.48 0.41 
Qual_1 0.20 0.49 
Qual_2 0.32 0.63 
 
Cronbach  
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.72) 
Principal Component Analysis (varimax – 2-factor solution) 
 
Factor 2 represents direct supervision and quality control with a Cronbach  of 0.72 (see table 
7). These (statistical) findings tend to reject the idea the existence of one dimension (control- 
versus commitment strategies in the approach of Walton and control- versus commitment HR 
systems in the approach of Arthur). Prior (conceptual and theoretical) work of Fleishman and 
 15
Peters (1962), Blake and Mouton (1964), Karasek (1979) and Simons (1995) also suggest a 
multidimensional reality with respect to management control of employees. Blake and 
Mouton's (1964) Managerial Grid focuses on leadership style, using a 2-dimensional 
framework with on the x-axis "attention for (production) tasks" and on the y-axis "attention 
for human relations". Karasek (1979) makes a distinction between the two dimensions "job 
control" (e.g. possibilities for self-control, autonomy, job decision latitude) and "job 
demands" (e.g. workload, responsibilities). We now claim to have both statistical- and 
theoretical arguments to build on a 2-factor-solution with respect to HRM in this study. 
Further analyses with respect to the HR bundles/systems are built on the two constructed 
factors labelled commitment HR systems (factor 1) and control HR systems (factor 2). These 
findings however might lead to problems with respect to hypothesis 1, as a result of the fact 
that hypothesis 1 assumes a 1-dimensional construct with respect to HRM.  
 
Institutional- or Coercive Mechanisms. The concept of coercive mechanisms was 
operationalised with the help of 6 items that reflect the influence of works councils and trade 
unions on conditions of employment and employees' development. Three other items on the 
impact of labour legislation (collective bargaining agreements and other labour laws) were 
excluded because of a lack of consistency and correlation between the different items. Again, 
principal component analysis (varimax rotation) was applied to construct two new factors: 
- 'works councils' (Cronbach  = 0.74) 
- 'trade unions' (Cronbach  = 0.75) 
The means and standard deviations of all individual HR items are summarised in table 8.  
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Table 8  Descriptive Institutional Mechanisms 
       Means  s.d.  
 
Works Councils         0.74 
Degree to which working conditions such as safety,  
hygiene and quality of work are influenced  
by the works council (wc_1)   3.02  0.92  
Degree to which labor conditions such as wages and  
rewards are influenced by the works council (wc_2) 2.16  0.90 
Degree to which the employees' development is influenced  
by the works council (wc_3)   2.52  0.80 
 
Trade Unions          0.75 
Degree to which working conditions like safety,  
hygiene and quality of working life are influenced  
by trade unions (trad_1)    1.79  0.84 
Degree to which labor conditions like wages and  
rewards are influenced by trade unions (trad_2) 2.69  1.20 
Degree to which the employees' development is influenced  
by trade unions (trad_3)    1.78  0.74 
scale: 1 = very little; 2 = little; 3 = reasonable; 4 = much; 5 = very much 
 
Control variables. The research design of this study controls for a lot of issues, but the two 
major control variables in this study are: sector and size of the organisation. Sector is 
controlled by the distinction between hotels, hospitals, and local governments. Size is 
measured by the number of employees working in the organisation (see table 9). 
 
Table 9  Control Variables 
       Means   s.d.  
 
Size of the organisation:      607   826 
(number of employees) 
 
Hotel (dummy: yes = 1, no = 0): n = 25 
Hospital (dummy: yes = 1, no = 0): n = 38 
Local Government (dummy: yes = 1, no = 0): n = 69 
 
Dependent variables. In this analysis we use 'typical' HRM outcomes as performance 
indicators: (1) absence due to illness; (2) average duration of absence due to illness; and (3) 
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employee turnover rate (see table 10). In the framework of Paauwe and Richardson (1997) 
HRM activities like recruitment, selection, planning and rewards affect HRM outcomes like 
employee satisfaction, motivation and retention. HRM outcomes affect firm performance like 
profit, market value and market share. There are some direct effects of HRM activities on 
firm performance (see for example Huselid, 1995), but the distance between HRM activities 
and firm or organisational performance is generally too large (Kanfer, 1994; Guest, 1997).  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics. The means on several of the individual HR items (employee influence, 
training, seminar, social, and rotation) are relatively low (see table 5). The same applies for 
the impact of trade unions and works councils on different conditions of employment and 
employees' development in organisations (see table 8). The organisations in the sample differ 
on size (number of employees). Hospitals have an average of 1605 employees, local 
governments an average of 238 employees, and hotels are relatively small with an average of 
89 employees. See table 4 for more detailed information. Hospitals and local governments are 
basically non-profit organisations with traditionally a high degree of institutionalisation in 
terms of  works councils' and trade unions' influence in combination with a strict observance 
of labour laws. Hotels are profit organisations, characterised by a relatively limited influence 
of trade unions together with frequently occurring absence of a works council. Only 50% of 
the hotels in this sample have a works council. All hospitals and local governments in this 
sample have a works council installed. There's a negative relationship between hotels (in 
comparison to both hospitals and local governments) and "the impact of a works council" (t = 
-2.51*) and "the impact of trade unions" (t = -2.58*). In other words, the respondents of 
hotels perceive less trade union and works council influence than the respondents of local 
governments and hospitals. Thus, we assume hospitals and local governments to be highly 
institutionalised in contrast to hotels with respect to the impact of institutional mechanisms on 
the shaping of human resource management. Both hypothesis 2a on size of the organisation 
and the degree of institutionalisation and hypothesis 2b on nature of the sector (non-profit 
versus profit organisations) are accepted with respect to Dutch hospitals, local governments 
and hotels. In further analyses the variable 'high institutions' is a dummy with value '1' in case 
of an hotel and value '0' in case of a hospital or local government. On average the 
organisations in the sample have an absence due to illness of 7%, an average duration of 
absence due to illness of 13.67 days, and an average employee turnover rate of 12% (see table 
10). 
 
 
 18
Table 10 Dependent Variables 
       Means   s.d. 
 
Absence due to illness (ill):    0.07   0.02 
(percentage absence due to illness of last year) 
 
Duration of absence (dur_ill):    13.67   7.71 
(average number of days of absence due to illness in days) 
 
Employee turnover (turn):     0.12   0.11 
(percentage employee turnover of last year) 
 
 
Correlation matrix. The correlations between the relevant variables are summarised in table 
11. Absence due to illness has a positive correlation with duration of absence due to illness 
(0.40***) and negative correlation with control HR systems (-0.21*). Control HR systems 
also negatively related to average duration of absence due to illness (-0.32**). Employee 
turnover is positively related to control HR systems (0.43***). Hotels seem to have a negative 
relation with duration of absence (-0.23*) and a positive relation with employee turnover 
(0.63***). Local governments reveal a negative relation with employee turnover (-0.40***) 
and a negative relation with control HR systems (-0.58***). Hotels have a positive relation 
with control HR systems (0.65***) and hospitals reveal a negative relation with commitment 
HR systems (-0.25**). Commitment HR systems are positively related to both the impact of 
works councils (0.24*) and the impact of trade unions (0.21*). It is hard to make any 
statement about the causal relationship of this latter remark. Do coercive mechanisms (like 
the impact of works councils and trade unions) affect the factor commitment HR systems 
positively, or does it work the other way around? Overall, there is some evidence that HR 
systems (more specifically "control HR systems") affect HR outcomes like absence due to 
illness and employee turnover.  
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Table 11 Correlations 
 
 
1.           2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1.Illness 
 
1.00           
2.Duration 
Illness 
0.40*** 1.00          
3.Turnover 
 
0.02           -0.16 1.00
4.Hotel 
 
0.00         -0.23* 0.63*** 1.00
5.Hospital 
 
-0.04           0.02 -0.11 -0.31** 1.00
6.Local 
Governm. 
0.04           0.18 -0.40*** -0.51*** -0.67*** 1.00
7.Size 
 
0.02          0.15 -0.17 -0.30** 0.77*** -0.48*** 1.00
8.Commit. 
HR systems 
-0.03           -0.11 0.05 0.11 -0.25** 0.12 -0.28** 1.00
9.Control 
HR systems 
-0.21*           -0.32** 0.43*** 0.65*** 0.05 -0.58*** -0.02 0.00 1.00
10.Works 
Council 
-0.01           -0.07 -0.10 -0.24* 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.24* -0.12 1.00
11.Trade 
Union 
0.16           0.07 -0.26 -0.24* -0.17 0.31** -0.04 0.21* -0.11 0.00 1.00
N =132  * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
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Table 12 Regression Analysis 
    Ill    Dur_ill    Turn 
   "absence due to illness"  "average duration absence" "employee turnover" 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 
Constant  0.07***  0.07***  14.98*** 20.18*** 0.13***  0.13*** 
Commitm. HR systems 0.00  0.00  -0.65  -1.45  0.00  0.00 
Control HR systems -0.01*  -0.04*** -2.36*  -6.36**  0.00  0.00 
Size   0.00  0.00  2.32  2.83*  -0.01  -0.01 
Hotel   0.02*  0.06***  --  --  0.14**  0.13*** 
Hospital   --  --  -4.37  -10.32*  --  -- 
Local Government 0.00  0.01  -0.03  -4.52  -0.06  -0.06 
Commitm. HR systems x  
   High Institutions --  0.00  --  2.12  --  0.01 
Control HR systems x  
   High Institutions --  0.04***  --  5.40*  --  0.00 
 
N   132  132  132  132  132  132 
Adj.R2   0.04  0.23  0.10  0.14  0.38  0.37 
F   1.86  5.68***  2.92*  3.01*  13.98*** 9.98*** 
 
 < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
all variables in the analyses are standardized  
 21
Regression Analyses. We have already mentioned the consequences for hypothesis 1 when 
building a model based on a 2-factor-solution with respect to HRM. Actually, building on a 2-
factor-solution on HRM makes it methodologically impossible to test hypothesis 1. We 
therefore focus on explorative empirical results with respect both control- and commitment 
HR systems, and testing hypothesis 3 about possible moderating (institutional) effects. In 
table 12 the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) are presented. In regression (1) we 
find a negative relationship between control HR systems and absence due to illness, although 
the F-statistic (1.86) reveals a poor model fit. In regression (2) we added an interaction term 
to look for mediating effects as stated in hypothesis 3. Again we find a negative relationship 
between control HR systems and absence due to illness, but we also find a significant 
interaction effect (control HR systems x high institutions). Regression (2) shows a better 
model fit (F = 5.68***). The dummy hotel is significant in both regressions indicating 
significant differences between hotels versus hospitals and local governments with respect to 
absence due to illness. 
 
Regression (3) and (4) reveal similar results. Control HR systems are negatively related to the 
average duration of absence due to illness and we also see a significant interaction effect 
(control HR systems x high institutions) in regression (4). Hospitals reveal lower scores on 
average duration of absence due to illness, but this effect might be overestimated because we 
also see a positive effect between size of the organisation and the dependent variable. And we 
know that hospitals are significantly larger than both hotels and local governments. 
Regression (5) and (6) do not reveal any shocking significant results with respect to both 
commitment- and control HR systems, or any possible significant interaction effect. The 
analyses show that hotels just score significantly higher on employee turnover than 
organisations in the other two branches of industry. Overall we come to the conclusion that: 
- control HR systems have a negative effect on both absence due to illness (Ill) and average 
duration of absence due to illness (Dur_ill)  
- commitment HR systems do not reveal any significant relationship with the three HR 
outcomes in this study 
- there are significant interaction effects with respect to control HR systems and 
institutionalisation (control HR systems x high institutions) in relationship to both 
absence due to illness (Ill) and average duration of absence due to illness (Dur_ill) 
 
The latter remark supports hypothesis 3 that the impact of a work system (commitment  and 
control human resource systems) on organisational performance is smaller in an 
institutionalised context than the impact of a work system (commitment  and control human 
resource systems) on organisational performance in a less institutionalised context.  
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 The negative effect of control HR systems on absence due to illness and average duration of 
employee absence is smaller in high institutionalised organisations (hotels and local 
governments) than in low institutionalised organisations (hotels) in the Netherlands. 
A striking side-effect is the fact that the variable 'size' does not play a (strong) significant role 
with respect to the performance of the organisation, the degree of institutionalisation, and the 
type of work systems as you would expect when taking into account prior research on HRM 
and performance (see overview Paauwe and Richardson, 1997; and Boselie et al., 2001) and 
existing literature on contingency theory (e.g. Woodward, 1960; Pugh and Hickson, 1976).  
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The most important findings in this study can be summarised as follows. First, we find 
evidence for a 2-factor-solution with respect to the operationalisation of HR systems instead 
of Walton's (1985) and Arthur's (1994) assumption that control- and commitment systems can 
be represented on a 1-dimensional continuum. We can conclude that the supposedly single 
dimension of control versus commitment in reality consists of two dimensions. Apparently 
work systems, aimed at strengthening commitment and empowerment, need at the same time 
to be embedded in a control systems. In this respect we refer to Simon's Control in an Age of 
Empowerment (1995) who demonstrates the necessity to link  commitment and belief systems 
to so-called boundary systems (made up of rules and procedures) and interactive and 
diagnostic control systems (amongst others by using direct supervision, feedback/evaluation 
and key performance indicators). In older leadership theories we see these two dimensions as 
well being represented. For example the managerial grid by Blake and Mouton (1964), who 
distinguish two dimensions, whereas Fleishman and Peters (1962) make a distinction between 
the dimensions of initiating structure and consideration. Karasek's (1979) distinction between 
the two dimensions "job control" (e.g. possibilities for self-control, autonomy, job decision 
latitude) and "job demands" (e.g. workload, responsibilities) resembles our distinction 
between the dimensions commitment- and control HR systems. 
 
Secondly, we find evidence for significant effects of control HR systems on two out of three 
HR outcomes in this study. A form of control, represented by supervision and quality control 
reveals a positive effect on presence of employees (in contrast to absence of employees).  
 
Thirdly, we find evidence for mediating effects of institutionalisation in the Dutch context. 
The effects of control HR systems on absence due to illness and average duration of absence 
due to illness are weaker in a high institutionalised context (hospitals and local governments) 
than in a less institutionalised context (hotels). Organisations in a less institutionalised context 
seem to have more leeway with respect to human resource management than organisations in 
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an institutionalised context. These findings provide strong arguments for future control in 
research on HRM and performance with respect to the degree of  institutionalisation. The 
degree of institutionalisation might significantly differ between countries like the USA versus 
the Netherlands (see for example Paauwe, 1998) and between branches of industry with a 
specific country (for example hotels versus hospitals versus local governments).  
 
A final remark relates to the research design and methods we have used. Following Arthur 
(1994) we have used a survey/questionnaire based quantitative research design. Reflecting on 
the results and looking back at what we have achieved we can seriously wonder if we should 
be happy with this kind of research in a setting in which institutions and stakeholders outside 
the company have such an influence. Probably the level of generated insights would have 
been far greater if we had stuck ourselves to our tradition of carrying out a number of in-depth 
case-studies using principles of theoretical sampling and grounded theory (Glaser and Straus, 
1967). In this way we could have achieved a distribution of case studies across different 
sectors (high and low on institutionalisation) and we would have involved the various 
stakeholders by interviewing them and by making use of document-analysis (for example 
minutes of the meetings of works council, trade unions etc). In this way in-depth case-studies 
would have enabled us to establish chains of cause and effects and would have provided 
ample means for analytical generalisations (Yin, 1989). 
 
Rotterdam, March 2002 
Boselie/Paauwe/Richardson4 
 
Notes 
1. USA research on HRM and performance: e.g. Arthur, 1994; Osterman, 1994; Huselid, 1995; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Koch and McGrath, 1996; Lazear, 1996; Ichniowski and Shaw, 1999. 
2. UK research on HRM and performance: e.g. Guest and Peccei, 1994; McNabb and Whitfield, 
1997; Guest, 1999; Hiltrop, 1999. 
3. Worldwide seminars and conferences on HRM and performance: e.g. the HRM Conference in 
Rotterdam (Erasmus University/London School of Economics, September 1995), the ESRC 
seminars in the UK (1996), parallel sessions in the Academy of Management meeting ('Failing to 
find Fit in SHRM: Problems and Prospects', 1998; 'The Impact of Human Resources on 
Organisational Performance', 1999;  'Human Resource Management and Firm Performance', 2000; 
'Human Resource Systems and Firm Performance', 2001), the first Dutch HRM Network 
Conference ('Confronting Theory and Reality', Erasmus University Rotterdam, November 1999), 
and the Global Human Resources Management Conference, track 1 on SHRM, in Barcelona 
(2001). 
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4. The authors would like to thank prof.dr. Paul Jansen (VU Amsterdam) for his suggestions with 
respect to Karasek's (1979) model. 
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